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ABSTRACT 
 While traditional behavioral decision theory as applied to negotiation sheds light on some 
of the barriers encountered in negotiations, it does not fully account for many of the difficulties 
and failures to reach settlement in ideologically-based disputes.  In this paper, we identify a 
number of factors that differentiate ideologically-based negotiations from other types of 
negotiation, and advance a perspective that takes into account the value-laden and institutional 
contexts in which they occur.  We illustrate our ideas by applying them to the organizationally 
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It has been nearly two decades since the decision analytic approach to negotiations 
(Raiffa, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 1991) altered the way scholars and practitioners think about 
negotiations and dispute resolution (Bazerman, 1998).  This approach asserts that most 
negotiation situations are not fixed-sum in nature, with each party vying to gain the largest share 
of a finite amount of resources.  Instead, it emphasizes the need to move away from purely 
distributive models of interaction by realizing the potential for integrative settlements that 
maximize the amount of available resources to be divided among all of the involved parties.  The 
approach also recognizes that people frequently squander valuable opportunities for joint gain by 
making faulty assumptions about the other party’s interests (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) or by 
relying upon the use of flawed judgment heuristics and cognitive biases. Pareto inferior 
outcomes are the product of systematic judgmental biases that can impede individuals’ optimal 
negotiation strategies.  These psychological obstacles to dispute resolution - including the 
mythical-fixed pie, the incompatibility bias, reactive devaluation, escalation of commitment, 
reference point effects, ignoring the cognitions of others and overconfidence (see Bazerman, 
Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000, for an in-depth discussion of these biases and how they play out 
in negotiation contexts) - impede effective dispute resolution in many contexts.  In this paper we 
argue that traditional behavioral decision theory (BDT), while helping us to understand 
inefficiencies in negotiation, does not fully explain failures in a special class of disputes, which 
we call “ideologically-based disputes.”   
Ideologically-based disputes, such as those involving societal issues (e.g., environment, 
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represent, or believe they represent, deeper ideological values.  We argue that ideologically-
based negotiations have a number of factors that differentiate them from other types of 
negotiations.  While the decision analytic literature can often identify the presence of biases, it is 
our contention that it cannot fully account for the sources and support of these failures in 
ideologically-based negotiations.  We argue that these failures are acute in ideologically-based 
negotiations and the literature must be augmented to include the influence of certain contextual 
factors that encourage and enhance these barriers and impediments to optimal outcomes.  In 
addition, we identify a set of barriers that extend beyond those from traditional BDT and help us 
to account for many of the difficulties and failures to reach settlement in ideologically-based 
negotiations.  Specifically, we identify two inter-related contextual mechanisms - individual 
values and social institutions - as barriers that impede efficient negotiations.  We contend that it 
is important to take into account the cultural, social, institutional, and value-laden contexts in 
which these real-world decisions are made and negotiations are conducted in order to fully 
understand this class of disputes.   
First, we argue that ideologically-based negotiations differ from other types of 
negotiations in that they invoke value system biases.  Values as barriers are present to varying 
degrees in all ideologically-based debates.  Value systems affect these negotiations via self-
enhancement, self-identity, and self-perception mechanisms on the part of the individual.  On 
such ideological levels, parties may be unwilling to collaborate, believing that mutually 
beneficial outcomes will require trade-offs and compromises that strike at the core of their moral 
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Second, we argue that institutional factors perpetuate these barriers and must be 
considered in any attempt to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes.  The conflicting interests in 
ideologically-based disputes invoke broader debates in institutional arenas such as government 
regulation and religious doctrine.  Institutions affect these negotiations via regulative, normative, 
and cognitive mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). Value systems are 
institutionally influenced, and overcoming the barriers they create will require an alteration of 
our social structures, not just our individual biases.  
We do not believe that the traditional BDT is incorrect in any fundamental sense or that it 
is no longer useful.  However, for ideologically-based issues we argue that understanding value 
and institutionally based biases is critical for resolving contemporary social debates.  While 
theorists have used BDT (Bazerman, Moore, & Gillespie, 1999) and institutional perspectives 
(Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999) to try to better understand 
ideologically-based conflict in the environmental domain, our approach merges these ideas by 
uniting the psychology of decision-making with the sociology of human action.  Also unique to 
ideological debates is the role of constituent groups who seek to drive institutional change based 
on value objectives rather than material interests.  Values create, sustain and change institutions 
in these arenas.  Furthermore, institutions have a powerful influence on the formation and 
perpetuation of values within these constituent groups and in society in general.  Thus, there is a 
strong reciprocal relationship between these two classes of barriers.  By highlighting and 
drawing links between these two domains, we wish to deepen our understanding of 
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 Finally, in this paper we primarily use the environmental domain to illustrate our ideas.  
Environmental negotiations are conflicts in which one or more parties represent, or believe 
themselves to represent, the interests of the environment.  The reason for our choice is that 
environmental negotiation is one type of ideologically-based conflict that is highly relevant to 
organizations.  Its relevance is illustrated, for example, by the debate over global climate change. 
 This debate has implications for virtually every industrial sector in the U.S. economy since the 
U.S. is presently the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.  Controls on greenhouse gas 
emissions will translate fundamentally into controls on energy generation and consumption, thus 
affecting energy dependent industries including both those in the energy field (e.g., electric 
utilities, transportation, mining, oil, and coal companies) and those that use energy heavily (e.g., 
paper and allied products, iron and steel manufacturing, petroleum refining, aluminum 
production, chemical manufacturing, and cement manufacturing).  In addition, environmental 
disputes possess certain characteristics that are common among all ideologically-based debates 
(i.e., the role of value systems and institutional forces).  We also note, however, that 
environmental negotiations are unique in that they impact organizational issues of technological 
advancement and economic competitiveness, invoke concerns for scientific complexity and 
uncertainty, and can transcend generational boundaries through their often vast geographic scale 
and long time horizons.  Unique characteristics of ideologically-based negotiation contexts, such 
as the environment, affect how the influence of value systems and institutional forces will play 
out in a specific context. 
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increasingly becoming an issue of interest in the study and analysis of organizational theory as 
businesses and organizations are increasingly affected by broader social issues such as global 
concern for human rights and working conditions, global warming, and the depletion of natural 
resources on which many industries depend.  We wish to uncover contextual reasons for the 
persistence of cognitive biases in ideologically-based contexts that inhibit the search for creative 
solutions that make multiple parties better off.  This paper will discuss how those biases take 
shape and how they can shield public debate on such issues as the environment from the pursuit 
of opportunities for mutual gain and efficient outcomes. 
VALUES AS BARRIERS 
 An important way in which ideologically-based conflicts differ from other types of 
conflict most often studied by behavioral negotiation theorists is the extent to which they involve 
core values and ideological beliefs.  In contrast to other negotiation domains, such as simple 
economic exchanges like commodity purchases, the issues in ideologically-based conflicts are 
very closely associated with negotiators’ identity.  Individuals' positions in ideologically-based 
negotiation typically emerge from beliefs at the core of who they are - what they believe about 
the reality of world, how the world behaves, what fundamental rights people have, notions of 
justice, and what is right and wrong.   Social psychologists argue that values, as central elements 
of the “self” can serve one of three different mechanisms: self-enhancement, or the furthering of 
one’s own interests;  self-identity, or the expression of oneself to the self and others; and self-
perception, a process whereby a person learns about one’s values by perceiving behaviors.  In 
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and outcomes of ideologically-based conflicts. 
Values and Self-enhancement 
 A number of scholars have argued that people involved in conflict are concerned with 
fairness (Adams, 1965; Bies & Moag, 1986; Deutsch, 1985; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1987; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  However, a robust finding emerging from the literature on 
fairness reveals that people are self-serving in their judgments of fairness.  Perhaps most striking 
is the fact that people seem to be completely unaware that their judgments of fairness are biased 
in a self-serving fashion (Allison & Messick, 1990; Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Babcock, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Messick, 1993; Messick & Rutte, 1992).  This is 
true for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that self-serving interpretations of 
fairness takes on several expressions, ranging from the biased selection of information that 
favors the self, to the discounting of information that favors others. 
 Notions of fairness stem from individuals’ basic values and often play an important role 
in negotiation (Camerer & Loewenstein, 1993; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996).  Fairness is a 
value that forms the logic for the resolution of many disputes, environmental or otherwise.  
Theoretically, fairness should serve the interests of justice by reigning in the powerful motive of 
self-interest (Messick & Sentis, 1983).  However, there is strong evidence that the principle of 
fairness tends to be applied in self-serving ways (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; Babcock, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996, 
1997).  Interpretations of fairness that are biased in a manner favoring the individuals making the 
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changing the importance of attributes affecting what is fair (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, and 
Bazerman, 1997).  In negotiation situations, people tend to judge that it is fair for them to have 
more of whatever resource is being allocated than an independent advisor would judge.   
 Egocentric interpretations of fairness act as a barrier to resolution of conflict in many 
negotiation contexts (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; Babcock et al., 1995; Wade-Benzoni et 
al., 1996) by preventing parties from reaching a consensus about what is fair.  In ideologically-
based disputes, however, egocentrism takes on a more virulent form because self-interest does 
not simply stem from ego-enhancement and monetary gain, but from one’s association with 
fundamental values.  Fundamental values represent core belief systems, which people seek to 
advance, protect, and maintain. Beliefs about what is fair in ideologically-based conflicts emerge 
from fundamental moral beliefs, which are deeply ingrained, hard to change, and associated with 
powerful emotions.  In addition, outcomes are tied to issues of high importance and, thus, there 
is much at stake.  Under such circumstances it is difficult for individuals to engage in role-
perspective taking (i.e., trying to see the situation from the other party’s point of view), which 
has been shown to help mitigate egocentrism (Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 
1983).   
 As we explained earlier, how these biases will play out in specific ideologically-based 
disputes depends on characteristics unique to those contexts.  One aspect of environmental 
conflicts that exacerbates egocentrism is that there is a great amount of uncertainty in 
environmental problems.  Often there is uncertainty about how or to what degree human 
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chemicals were the cause of the deformation of frogs in lakes around the United States in the 
mid-1980s, but uncertainty remains (Kaiser, 1997).  In addition, much real world ecological 
debate concerns the definition of "safe" levels of resource use, such as the question of how much 
fish can be harvested from the world's oceans without destroying the abilities of fish populations 
to sustain themselves.  It is rarely clear what levels of resource exploitation will not endanger 
future access to it (Messick, 1991).  Parties involved in environmental negotiations often have 
trouble agreeing on such basic items as the extent to which a problem exists and the urgency of 
developing some sort of jointly negotiated response (Rubin, 1993).  Theorists have argued that 
when there is uncertainty about how resources should be allocated, there is more "room" for the 
egocentric bias to form (Bazerman, Wade-Benzoni, & Benzoni, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Wade-
Benzoni et al., 1996,1997).  Given the prevalence of egocentrism in situations imbued with 
uncertainty, egocentrism is apt to be very problematic in environmental negotiations.   
Values and Self-identity 
 In addition to serving self-interests, values also define the self.  A large literature in 
social psychology suggests that people identify themselves with particular groups and hence, 
define their identities via their social relationships with other groups and institutions (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986).  In this sense, individuals seek to construct their own identities and communicate 
or project these identities to others.  Ideologically-based conflicts involve issues that people 
consider to be more core to self-identity than do most other conflicts.  For example, many people 
believe that the natural environment was created by a divine entity (i.e., God).  Even among 
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religious element.  These spiritual elements drive, at least in part, feelings of sacredness toward 
the environment.    
 The more central a value is to an individual’s identity, the more “sacred” that issue 
becomes.  As an example, if a self-defined “environmentalist” negotiates free tickets on an 
airline when his luggage is lost, the negotiation does not reflect on his self-identity; however, 
when this person negotiates with a local developer to protect a wildlife refuge, his core self-
identity becomes involved in the negotiation.  To the extent that conflicts involve people’s core 
values and beliefs, people will be more emotional, less able to think in an integratively complex 
fashion, and less likely to conceive or consider tradeoffs on issues involving those core values 
(Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000; Thompson & Gonzalez, 1997).  People will be 
more rigid and single-minded in their argument content and style.  To the extent that these issues 
are viewed as ‘sacred,’ people are more likely to be willing to defend these values at any cost 
(Tetlock et al., 2000).    
 People make tradeoffs and place monetary value on sacred issues in a more or less 
routine manner (see Tetlock, Peterson & Lerner, 1996).  However, people do not cognitively, or 
emotionally understand their behavior in this way (Rokeach, 1973).  When people are questioned 
or confronted with what appears to be an inconsistency between their attitudes and actual 
behaviors, they will vehemently deny that they have compromised their values (Tetlock et al., 
1996).  People have highly elaborate cognitive, motivational, and emotional apparatuses to allow 
them to feel that they are being true to their core value system.  Consider, for example, a person 
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resources in order to safeguard options for both present and future generations.  This same 
person opposes a regulation that would ban drivers from operating vehicles that were produced 
before 1975 (older vehicles produce the largest amount of emissions) also on the grounds of 
personal freedom.  The simple truth is that it is virtually impossible for people to not make 
tradeoffs among core values (Rokeach, 1973), since tradeoffs are a consequence of social 
existence (Tetlock et al., 1996). 
 It is in this sense that "sacred" issues are not always sacred, but in fact, are pseudo-sacred 
(Thompson & Gonzalez, 1997).  That is, although people profess a belief that issues are sacred, 
their choices indicate that they are not sacred, but tradable.  Explicit trades involving sacred 
issues (i.e., those that are consciously made, such as that which might occur between negotiators 
or politicians trying to work out a deal) can be labeled taboo while tradeoffs involving those 
same issues may become acceptable when they are hidden or are less obvious (Fiske & Tetlock, 
1997). It is very likely, for example, that the group decision to launch the space shuttle 
Challenger did not explicitly discuss the benefits of on-time launch as measured against the 
possible loss of life, but this tradeoff was nevertheless implicit in the choice (Vaughan, 1997).     
Values and Self-perception 
 We have discussed the role that values play in serving self-interest and defining the self.  
Another role that values play is in self-perception, in that they allow the individual to infer what 
he or she cares about.   Our treatment here derives from the seminal work of Bem (1967) in his 
theory of self-perception.  In its purest form, self-perception theory states that individuals have 
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value systems.  According to this theory, behaviors exert a powerful effect on attitudes and self-
perceptions.  Where it is beyond the scope of our paper to review the large literature on self-
perception, psychology of action is relevant to our treatment of ideologically-based negotiations.  
 There is an asymmetry in ethical systems between action and inaction.  We are held 
responsible (or we hold ourselves responsible) for harms that we cause through action, but not 
for harms that we fail to prevent (Baron, 1996).  Simple utilitarianism holds that moral 
obligation depends on expected consequences - we should always choose the option that yields 
the best-expected consequences overall.  However, while utilitarianism makes no distinction 
between acts and omissions, individuals' intuitions are systematically biased to make this 
distinction.   
 People distinguish between harms caused by acts and those caused by omissions (not 
acting) (Baron, 1996). Ritov and Baron (1990) examined how people make decisions to 
vaccinate.  They found that individuals were reluctant to vaccinate children to reduce their 
chances of death from a flu epidemic if there was a chance that the vaccine itself would kill a 
small number of children (the lives it saved outnumbered the lives lost).  Subjects' justification 
for this behavior was that they would be responsible for any deaths caused by the vaccine, but 
they would not be as responsible for deaths caused by failure to vaccinate.   
 Other studies conducted by Baron and his colleagues (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Spranca, 
Minsk, and Baron, 1991) have indicated a general bias toward omissions over acts that produce 
the same harmful outcome.  Baron and Ritov (1994) found that the asymmetry between action 
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outcome produced by another option.  This effect, labeled "the omission bias" is thus defined as 
the tendency to consider harmful acts to be worse than equally harmful omissions - as caused by 
the use of a heuristic rule against causing harm (relative to the foregone option) through action 
(Baron, 1996).  The results can be characterized as a rule against "doing harm" (as opposed to 
"allowing harm to happen").   
 If people learn their values from the actions in which they engage, then this omission bias 
can be understood in terms of self-perception.  People prefer to perceive themselves as 
individuals who value bringing about good in the world.  When they engage in an action that 
causes harm (commission), it is likely to challenge that self-perception.  As a result, people tend 
to avoid, where possible, action that will directly cause harm.  However, if the same harm results 
from inaction (omission), then this challenge to one’s self-perception can be largely avoided.  In 
short, when we act, it can challenge what we understand our values to be; in contrast, when we 
do not act, we can avoid this challenge.   
 We argue that the "omission bias" has the potential to act as a barrier in ideologically-
based negotiations.  For example, imagine an environmental debate where one side wishes to 
save jobs and the other wants to preserve as many acres of old growth forest as possible.  The 
party looking out for jobs may be reluctant to make an agreement that will result in the loss of 
200 jobs in one area (saving 500 acres of forest), even though it means a tradeoff that will result 
in a gain of 1000 jobs in another area (and a loss of 100 acres of forest).  This would be an 
integrative tradeoff for both parties, but the economic-interests party would be responsible for 
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for jobs lost from no agreement.   
 As another example, imagine that the size of a gasoline tax is being negotiated.  Such a 
tax would benefit future generations and reduce the burdens that have already been created for 
them (e.g., the tax helps reduce pollution and conserve natural resources).  However, by 
imposing a tax we create a "harm" to certain people in society for whom the tax would be a 
tremendous burden (e.g., the financially disadvantaged who must drive cars to get to work).  
Even though the benefits to future generations outweigh these costs, we choose to "do nothing" 
(i.e., do not impose a large tax) because we feel less responsible for the harm experienced by 
future generations as a result of our inaction than the harm experienced by those of today's world 
as a result of our actions.   
RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES BETWEEN VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 
The effects of individual level biases that permeate ideologically-based debates cannot be 
fully understood without also considering the social and institutional context within which they 
reside (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995).  Ideological debates, more so than other types 
of disputes, engage broad sets of actors whose interests, objectives and values tend to expand 
and complicate the issues under dispute. Centered around common issues (Hoffman, 1999), these 
"fields" of actors become "arenas of power relations" (Brint & Karabel, 1991: 355) in which 
dialogue and debate construct the very definition of issues in the form of rules, norms, and 
beliefs.  They can be comprised of any constituent that imposes a coercive or regulative, 
normative, or cognitive influence on the organization (Scott, 1991) and they set the context 
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logging company and the government over logging practices, for example, cannot be conducted 
without consideration of the perspectives from environmental activists, the local community, and 
scientific academies.  
A factor common to all ideologically-based debates is the presence of activist groups that 
lobby for social change based on value objectives rather than strict material interests (e.g., 
gender equity, civil rights, environmental protection and labor relations). These social groups 
connect the values of their cause with their personal identity, creating a value congruence that is 
a potent force for social change.  These activist organizations have little material stake in 
organizational output, yet influence that output through ideological activism.  They become, 
what may be described as cultural or institutional entrepreneurs, driving change in the norms, 
values and beliefs of organizational systems (Fligstein, 1997; Troast, Riley, Hoffman, & 
Bazerman, 2001).  Hence, they represent a link between values and institutional forces in 
ideologically-based conflicts.  This link can be both direct (e.g. through face to face 
negotiations) and indirect (e.g., through regulative and normative institutional change).  
There is a strong reciprocal relationship between values and institutions.  First, consider 
how values lead to the creation of institutions.  That is, in many cases it is because someone 
values something that institutions are created.  For example, decades ago John Muir established 
the Sierra Club because he valued the preservation of the wilderness.  Today, this institution has 
over 640,000 members and seeks to influence a wide range of environmental policies (e.g., land 
use and preservation issues).  Values also sustain institutions.  For example, one reason we have 
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preserve it.   
Institutions also influence values, both intentionally and unintentionally.   Institutions 
shape policy, which is enacted through the law.  Laws in turn affect values since people view the 
law in moral terms (i.e., laws influence what people believe is right and wrong).  Institutions 
often also directly appeal to the public in attempts to influence values.  For example, in 1994 the 
freshman Republicans sought to roll back environmental protection.  In response, environmental 
groups (such as the Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, and the Rainforest Action 
Network) mobilized significant public opposition to this endeavor and, as a result, were 
successful in stopping its implementation. 
INSTITUTIONS AS BARRIERS 
 More than simply identifying the role of constituency groups in ideologically-based 
debates, we must also consider the institutional rules, norms and beliefs that emerge from them 
and define the appropriate way of perceiving the world around us. Institutions create descriptions 
of collective reality for individuals and organizations; explanations of what is and what is not, 
what can be acted upon and what cannot. As the institutional field establishes new codes of 
conduct, the emergent institutions reflect these evolving perceptions, both as a source of 
empowerment (e.g. defining what they can do) and as a source of control (e.g. limiting options 
for consideration) (Jepperson, 1991; Fligstein, 1992). More importantly, attempts to redefine 
field level institutions must acknowledge the inertia that exists within the existing institutional 
structure.   
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autonomous units able to define complex issues on terms purely of their own design.  They are 
bound by the social influences embodied in rules, laws, industry standards, best-established 
practices, conventional wisdom, social norms and religious doctrine.  These social influences 
present cultural and contextual constraints that can alter individual and organizational 
perspectives on social issues (i.e., values).  In short, this section will consider how the obstacles 
to effective decision-making in ideologically-based conflicts are often institutional, not simply 
cognitive (Ember, 1991, Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999). By focusing on institutions, we can go 
beyond assessments of strict individual action to question exactly what are some of the sources 
of those actions. 
Institutions are manifested in three levels: regulative, normative and cognitive (Scott, 
1995). Each level differs in the degree to which it is visible and ranges from the directly coercive 
to the taken-for-granted (Zucker, 1983). Regulative (or legal) aspects of institutions most 
commonly take the form of regulations.  They guide organizational action and perspectives by 
coercion or threat of legal sanction.  Organizations accede to them for reasons of expedience, 
preferring not to suffer the penalty for non-compliance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In 
responding to a regulative institution, one might ask — What are my interests in this situation? 
(March, 1981).  Normative (or social) aspects of institutions generally take the form of rules-of-
thumb, standard operating procedures, occupational standards, and educational curricula.  Their 
ability to guide organizational action and beliefs stems largely from social obligation or 
professionalization.  Organizations will comply with them for reasons of moral/ethical 
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training institutions and trade associations.  In responding to a normative institution, one might 
ask — Given my role in this situation, what is expected of me? (March, 1981). Cognitive (or 
cultural) aspects of institutions embody cultural rules and frameworks that guide our 
understanding of the nature of reality and the frames through which that meaning is developed.  
Organizations will abide by them often without conscious thought (Zucker, 1983).  They form a 
culturally supported and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy that becomes unquestioned. 
Taken as a whole, the three pillars form a composite set of filters through which important issues 
are perceived and appropriate actions are developed (Fligstein, 1992; Hoffman & Ventresca, 
1999).  Below we focus our discussion on how these three levels of institutional barriers can play 
out in the domain of environmental conflicts. 
Regulative Aspects of Institutions 
Legal standards provide individuals with guidelines for acceptable behavior.  While laws 
can come into play in many types of negotiations, they are more heavily influential in 
ideologically-based negotiations since they affect our moral and ethical systems and beliefs.  In 
addition, the law itself might be the issue under dispute in ideologically-based negotiations.   
In the environmental domain, legal standards can reduce destructive self-interested behavior, 
raise consciousness about environmentally destructive behavior and enhance the protection of 
common goods such as forests and clean air (Rosenbaum, 1991; Plater, Abrams, & Goldfarb, 
1992).  It is clear that legal standards are beneficial and necessary (Easterbrook, 1995).  
However, recent theoretical and empirical work (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Messick, and 
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the costs nor deter us from diagnosing problems that may arise from a strict regulatory approach 
to problems that has become outdated.  Regulations are a force for inertia once institutionalized.  
If the context for which they were designed changes, then they can force organizations and 
individuals to engage debate in outdated forms and frames.   
One common response to identifiable problems in standard-based systems is to blame the 
existing standard and suggest that a replacement standard is needed (e.g., Kerr, 1975).  
Dysfunctional aspects of standards can interfere with ideologically-based negotiations, 
environmental and otherwise, by causing individuals to be overly focused on the standard itself 
rather than the purpose behind the standard.  Some theorists argue that the failure of existing 
regulatory programs may be the biggest challenge faced by environmentalists (Rosenbaum, 
1991; Anderson and Leal, 1991).  For example, imagine a debate concerning a pollution 
standard.  On the one hand, a stricter standard will allow less pollution to be emitted into the 
atmosphere but will increase the economic burden on complying industries.  On the other hand, a 
more lenient standard allows more pollution and costs less.  The environmentalists in the debate 
argue to make the standard as rigorous as possible in order to protect the environment, while 
industry tries to negotiate for the lowest possible standard in order to keep costs low.  The result 
is positional bargaining (win-lose) where each party tries to influence precisely where the 
standard is set.  Further, the positions in the debate can be predicted by the participants' 
structural position.  Industry always opposes environmental regulation because, in their view, 
they "always" cost more.  Environmentalists always push for stricter regulations accepting that 
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purpose behind the standard - which is to protect the environment and not put companies out of 
business.   
An alternative solution that better meets the interests of both parties (win-win) while 
getting at the purpose behind the standard is prevented from emerging.  Such a solution may 
involve the development of an alternative compliance strategy or the use of a different 
technology by the industry involved in the debate. Innovative techniques for managing the 
pollution measured by the standard while reducing overall pollution and reducing costs for the 
economic interests involved may never be discussed while the parties are structurally focused on 
debate over the standard itself. 
Tenbrunsel et al. (1997, 2000) utilize a psychological perspective to investigate the 
problems associated with standards while not denying the benefits.  They propose that one of the 
main sources of these costs is that legal standards become an independent force, taking on a life 
of their own - leaving rationality, innovativeness and societal interests behind.  They suggest that 
sub-optimal outcomes can result from an adherence to standards, and that this sub-optimality is 
due to a tendency for standards to direct attention toward the law itself and away from the 
purpose behind the law.  Similarly, Sitkin & Bies (1994) point out that legalistic procedures can 
undermine social goals by fostering a superficial reliance on that which has an acceptable 
rationale (i.e., meets the letter of the law) over that which is socially rational (i.e., meets the 
spirit of the law). 
For example, through environmental regulation, pollution has historically been 
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Environmental Protection Agency has regulated through a command-and-control format where 
industry is required to comply with strict technology or performance standards.  This type of 
coercive structure creates an adversarial relationship where industry, government and 
environmental interests fight a battle over the precise level of these standards.  Negotiated 
solutions in which economic and environmental benefits are mutually achieved are overlooked, 
both in the establishment and implementation of these standards.  Citing this problem, a 1997 
Mellon Foundation report charged that "the [present] system’s priorities are wrong, it is 
ineffective in dealing with many current problems, and it is inefficient and excessively 
intrusive… The future system should be results-oriented, integrated, efficient, participatory, and 
information rich" (Davies and Mazurek, 1997: 48).  In a similar spirit, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (1999) announced that the current regulatory system is too costly and 
inflexible to deal with contemporary environmental problems. 
Hoffman & Ventresca (1999) have argued that once standards are written, program 
managers within both government and corporations often become constrained by rigid rules, 
which preclude the search for creative solutions to newly emerging and complex environmental 
problems.  For example, the permitting requirements under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) restrict hazardous waste recycling initiatives by strictly imposing 
regulation on those wastes once created.  Any company that creates hazardous wastes and then 
attempts to recycle or reuse it will be required to obtain a hazardous waste "Part B" permit for 
treatment of a hazardous waste.  This is an extremely expensive and time consuming process. In 
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and away from the purpose behind the law. 
Tenbrunsel et al. (1997) discuss both cognitive and motivational explanations for this 
"misdirected attention" effect.  They argue that one explanation for this misdirected attention is 
the cognitive distortions that standards can produce (Tenbrunsel et al., 2000).  They explain that 
standards may produce sub-optimal outcomes because they act as a category boundary, which 
distorts and hides the purpose behind the standard.  They show empirically how one mechanism 
- the number of options presented to the individual - may influence the observed sub-optimality. 
 As a result, decision makers may be led to evaluate sub-optimal choices that adhere to a 
standard more highly than optimal choices that violate the standard. 
Tenbrunsel et al. (1997) also suggest a motivational explanation for the "misdirected 
attention" effect, namely that standard-based systems can change the incentive systems for 
individuals and promote self-interested behavior that interferes with over-arching societal 
interests.  Sub-optimal outcomes are the product of both unintentional and intentional actions on 
the part of the decision maker.  Unintentional actions may result from individuals "just following 
the rules," creativity not being rewarded, a "use it or lose it" rationale, intrinsic motivation being 
replaced with extrinsic motivation, or a "no law against it" mentality.  Intentional actions include 
trying to "beat the system."    
Normative Aspects of Institutions 
Laws are not the only realm in which institutional biases permeate the framing of 
ideologically-based conflicts.  Institutional barriers also become established within the normative 
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Educational curricula are forms of socialization for future professionals.  Embedded 
within their programs and requirements are values and beliefs.  In the environmental domain, 
these may refer to the relationship between the environment and human activity.  In some cases, 
environmental issues are excluded from consideration altogether. For example, despite the 
reality that many companies are finding ways to integrate environmental and strategic 
considerations (Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Arnst, Reed, McWilliams & Weimer, 1997), a 
1998 survey by the World Resources Institute found that “only 16 percent of [business] schools 
report integrating environment into core or departmental requirements, thus only a few MBAs 
truly receive environment-business training" (Finlay, Bunch & Neubert, 1998).  In another 
example from Hoffman & Ventresca (1999), undergraduate chemical engineering education 
often focuses on the material efficiency and yield when teaching chemical plant design.  They 
often overlook the waste considerations in cost factors or in reducing polluting activities. Rather 
than taught as an integral element of plant design, it is generally taught as a separate topic, not to 
be integrated into overall design parameters.   
Even programs that incorporate environmental issues can perpetuate mindsets that inhibit 
creative dispute resolution.  Economics education, for example, generally treats environmental 
protection as an "externality" to market behavior (Cropper & Oates, 1992), ignoring the potential 
for innovative integrative agreements.  Pollution is conceptualized as the consequence of an 
absence of prices for certain scarce environmental resources, such as clean air and water. To 
trigger corporate environmental action, economists prescribe the introduction of surrogate or 
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provide the needed signals to economize on the use of these resources (Hahn & Stavins, 1991).  
The underlying assumption is that corporate managers will never find it in their own interests to 
seek environmental protection unless the government imposes some form of economic cost. 
Professional standards are a continuation of socialization begun by educational curricula, which 
can also inhibit creative dispute resolution.  For example, professional accounting practices 
generally lists pollution costs as a liability and not an asset on balance sheets, even if the 
expenditure results in decreased compliance and disposal costs, or savings in other areas such as 
improved public relations, liability and regulatory reduction, or energy savings. Individual 
managers are often shielded from incentives to seek more efficient solutions to environmental 
problems as environmental costs are lumped together as overhead costs, not for the department 
but for the corporation. For example, the federal government buys its buildings with one budget 
and operates them with another. Any up-front cost increases may be overlooked despite their 
potential for minimizing operating expenses and yielding short payback horizons (Lovins & 
Lovins, 1997). In a similar way, most corporations pay for energy costs out of overhead 
expenses. So, while small incremental reductions can yield large company wide paybacks, most 
firms overlook them as individual departments remain unaware of their economic impacts and 
focus instead on investments that increase output or market share (Brown & Levine, 1997).  
Organizational structure can also create barriers to efficient dispute resolution. For 
example, over the past twenty-five years, corporations have developed large environmental, 
health and safety departments to handle the command-and-control system of environmental 
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However, reducing pollution in the most efficient manner requires collaboration between the 
environmental and manufacturing line sectors.  The manufacturing line personnel know the 
process and financial objectives while the environmental staff know the environmental priorities 
and objectives. Yet, traditionally segmented structures and responsibilities may preclude such 
opportunities (Hoffman, 1997). Segmented staffs within the organization use different 
terminology, engage with different external stakeholders and justify their initiatives using 
different metrics. A 1995 survey by Arthur D. Little found that where main line departments use 
measures such as return on investment (ROI) and earnings per share (EPS), most environmental 
managers do not provide such economic cost-benefit analyses on environmental initiatives when 
attempting to gain budgetary approval. To make the boundaries even more impermeable, 
environmental managers often use non-business acronyms such as pounds of toxics, biological 
oxygen demand (BOD), notice of deficiency (NOD), environmental impact statement (EIS), and 
life cycle assessment (LCA) (Shelton & Shopley, 1995).  
As an example, a collaborative case study between Dow Chemical and the Natural 
Resources Defense Council found that the failure to look beyond accepted objectives were the 
primary inhibitor of the adoption of pollution prevention initiatives at one Dow facility, despite 
the projection that the company could possibly save more than $1 million a year by eliminating 
500,000 pounds of waste. Since the program was not required for the purposes of environmental 
compliance, it was not of central interest to production engineers whose main priorities were 
capacity building, and did not appeal to business line personnel with profit-and-loss authority, 
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profit for their business through yield improvements rather than waste minimization (Greer & 
Van Loben Sels, 1997).  
Cognitive Aspects of Institutions 
At the root of these regulative and normative dimensions of institutions are cognitive 
level beliefs.  An example from the environmental domain is the belief that economic growth 
and environmental protection are largely incompatible.  The belief that increasing stringency of 
environmental regulation “must,” by its very nature, result in reduced profits for the firm 
(Palmer, Oates & Portney, 1995: 121) is one example.  This tradeoff is a “necessity” for 
achieving environmental improvements (Wally & Whitehead, 1994: 4).  In this model of the 
debate, the existence of a win-win or cost-free solution to environmental problems neither makes 
sense nor is it recognized.  By definition, the balance between environmental costs and benefits 
becomes a zero-sum game.  The win-lose perspective reinforces confrontational rather than 
cooperative approaches by opposing interests in real world conflicts (such as logging practices in 
the face of endangered species protection or utility operations under increasingly stringent clean 
air requirements).  Based on win-lose positions, economic and environmental interests fight a 
distributive battle over concessionary agreements with each side pursuing its goals by 
demonizing the other.  Environmentalists are perceived as insensitively seeking environmental 
protection at all costs and willing to sacrifice economic development and human economies 
toward that end.  Economic interests are perceived as pursuing economic growth at all costs, 
willing to forfeit environmental considerations to increase profit.  With this mindset, joint 
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FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 Researchers have already begun to identify the presence of the barriers we have 
discussed in ideologically-based disputes.  For example, Wade-Benzoni et al. (1996) found 
evidence of egocentric biases in the interpretations of fairness specifically in an environmental 
negotiation context.  In a simulated social dilemma based on the real-life crisis in the 
northeastern fisheries, a relationship was found between higher harvesting levels and higher 
levels of egocentrism.  Tenbrunsel et al.’s (2000) recent empirical work on the influence of 
environmental standards on judgments and choices offers an example of how research can merge 
institutional and cognitive perspectives.  They found that standards exert an influence on 
judgments of proposed environmental solutions that is independent of the extent to which those 
solutions protect the environment, and that standard-based decisions produce cognitive 
distortions, artificially enhancing the attractiveness of standard-conforming solutions over that of 
nonconforming solutions.   
 The next step for future research is to understand better the role that values and 
institutions play in ideologically-based disputes.  One direction would be to explore the role of 
incorrect assumptions in disputes involving sacred issues.  Parties often make incorrect 
assumptions about the sources of sacredness of issues.  For example, in the abortion debate, pro-
choice advocates may incorrectly assume that pro-life advocates’ beliefs come from affiliations 
with religious institutions (e.g., Catholicism) when in fact they may come instead from their 
understanding of biology and their beliefs about where life begins.  Institutionally, these two 
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terminology, which tends to perpetuate their intractability.  Pro-choice advocates talk of women's 
rights and pro-life advocates talk of the protection of a child's life.  While mutually compatible 
solutions may be possible, cultural and institutional barriers inhibit their discovery.  In addition, 
parties often make incorrect assumptions about the extremeness or radical-ness of the other side. 
 For example, all environmentalists do not endorse sinking whaling ships or spiking trees as a 
means to protect endangered animals.  Similarly, all developers are not cold-hearted animal and 
tree haters.  Both environmentalists and developers span a broad range of “radical-ness.”  
However, when each side assumes that the other is more radical than they are likely to be, then 
positional behavior tends to be reinforced and the credibility of the other side is questioned, 
making negotiation proceedings even more difficult.  These assumptions are embedded both 
within individual level values and societal level institutions.  Each are interconnected, forming 
and being formed by the other (Giddens, 1979). 
 Related to the above discussion, there can also be immediate dislike of opposing parties 
on an interpersonal level based solely on their position on an issue.  In other words, there can be 
incorrect assumptions about “the kind of person they are.”  Because of their position in the 
dispute and inferences made about their value systems, opponents judge each other’s ethical 
nature in addition to credibility, trustworthiness, and legitimacy.  This additional level of conflict 
on a more personal level can serve to escalate the dispute and lend further complexity to the 
resolution process.  Thus, a direction for future research would be to explore the dynamics 







  30 
 Ideologically-based disputes share many features with other types of negotiations, but 
also represent an interesting and complex constellation of unique characteristics, which we have 
discussed. We have outlined the key barriers encountered in ideologically-based negotiation that 
extend beyond those identified in the traditional decision analytic approach to negotiations.  We 
believe our approach, which takes into account values and institutions, provides a better 
framework for understanding the dysfunctional and socially irrational outcomes in many 
ideologically-based disputes. Hopefully, this paper serves to help others better understand why 
wise agreements do not easily emerge in complex ideologically-based negotiations.  The barriers 
to efficient resolution of these conflicts are large. However, an awareness of these barriers is 
crucial to moving toward solutions.  We believe that the importance of ideologically-based 
disputes justifies special attention to their efficient resolution.  Society has a powerful interest in 
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